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Abstract—A new generation of WSN communication
transceivers are now available that support time-of-flight
distance measurement. This measurement can be insepara-
bly integrated with message transmission making it possible
to authenticate messages based on distance. In this paper
we present a practical implementation of Distance Based
Message Authentication (DBMA) for WSNs using Nanotron
NA5TR1 transceivers. We show that DBMA can be used
to reject messages sent from outside a secure (trusted)
area. With DBMA, messages can be authenticated without
involving costly cryptographic algorithms. The DBMA
implementation is evaluated in two different deployment
scenarios. Distance measurement errors and their impact
on the size of the required secure area are evaluated.
Furthermore, we present methods to reduce the size of
the required secure area.
I. INTRODUCTION
A new generation of communication transceivers are
now available that support time-of-flight distance mea-
surement. As RF propagation speed is a constant, senders
cannot decrease propagation delay to produce a short-
ened distance measurement. It is also possible to ensure
that distance measurement and message transmission
are performed inseparably. A receiver can thus reject a
message if the measured distance to the sender is above
a set threshold. We refer to this method of authentication
as Distance Based Message Authentication (DBMA).
DBMA may be used as an additional layer of defense to
increase protection levels or as a replacement for authen-
tication mechanisms based on traditional cryptography.
DBMA is only useful in scenarios where potential
attackers can be excluded from the WSN deployment
area. This is certainly not possible in all WSN deploy-
ments; however, many deployments exist where physical
access is restricted and monitored. Examples are WSN
deployments in buildings, factories or military installa-
tions. In these scenarios DBMA prevents injection of
messages from potential attackers located outside of the
WSN deployment area.
Physical access control requires the implementation
of a security boundary, normally in form of a fence
or a wall. The question is where the fence in relation
to the WSN deployment has to be placed such that
DBMA can be effective. At first glance it seems the
fence must be placed such that the distance from each
node to the fence is larger than the distance of each
node to its communication peers in the WSN. Unfortu-
nately, the measured distances in a real-world DBMA
implementation are erroneous and may be larger (but
never shorter!) than the Euclidean distance as signals
may follow non-line-of-sight paths. The fence must
therefore be placed using measured distances and not
Euclidean distances. Thus, undesired additional space
between deployment and fence is required to compensate
for distance measurement errors.
Consider a network with two nodes, A and B, that
have the Euclidean distance of 5m. A secure area could
be constructed using the union of two circles with radius
5m drawn around A and B. Nodes A and B will
reject communication from further away than 5m. Now
consider that the measured distance between A and B is
between 5m and 6m. In this case A and B would reject
genuine transmissions as they appear to originate from
outside the secure area. By constructing the secure area
using 6m circles around A and B the problem can be
corrected. Note that it is not acceptable to simply subtract
expected errors from measurements as an attacker may
be able to produce error free measurements.
Obviously, distance measurement errors have an im-
pact on fence positioning and the resulting size of the
secure area. A secure area cannot be arbitrarily large in
a practical WSN deployment; it may be too expensive
or just impossible to acquire land. It is therefore the aim
of this paper to analyze the required secure area size
of a practical DBMA implementation and to investigate
methods useful to reduce the secure area size. The
specific contributions of this paper are:
• Implementation: We present an implementation of
DBMA using Nanotron NA5TR1 [1] transceivers.
• Evaluation: We evaluate distance measurement er-
rors and resulting secure area size in two different
WSN deployments.
• Optimisation: We reduce the secure area size by
pruning links with high distance measurement er-
rors from the WSN topology.
The paper is organised as follows. Related work is
discussed next. Section III introduces our RTTMAP
protocol used to implement DBMA. We detail our im-
plementation of RTTMAP for the Nanotron NA5TR1
transceiver in Section IV. The impact on secure area
size from distance measurement error is evaluated in
Section V. Section VI evaluates methods to reduce the
secure area size. We conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Traditional cryptographic authentication is difficult to
implement on resource-constrained sensor nodes. Exist-
ing work aims to improve efficiency of cryptography by
employing dedicated hardware or optimised algorithms
(For example, [2], [3], [4], [5]). Our work provides
an alternative authentication mechanism which does not
(similar to [6]) expose cryptographic mechanisms to
attackers. The problem of trustworthy distance measure-
ments has been discussed in the context of positioning
systems [7]. We now discuss these topics.
The IEEE 802.15.4 [2] standard defines Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) message encryption and au-
thentication on the link-layer. The cryptographic algo-
rithms are executed by specialized hardware within the
transceiver chip. Hu et al. [3] propose the integration
of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip on a sen-
sor node. This specialised hardware is able to execute
cryptographic algorithms efficiently. Liu et al. [4] and
Szczechowiak et al. [5] both investigate libraries for
elliptic curve cryptography in wireless sensor networks.
Elliptic curve cryptography is the most efficient way
of providing public key cryptography. Furthermore, the
libraries provide a number of optimization switches
which can turn specific optimizations on or off. Thus, it
is possible to implement efficiently strong cryptography
on resource constrained sensor nodes.
Martinovic et al. [6] propose a method for message
authentication which does - similar to DBMA - not rely
on cryptographic mechanisms for message authentica-
tion. Sensor nodes are prevented from receiving unau-
thorised transmissions. Nodes in the network monitor
transmissions and jam signals that are perceived to be
transmitted by unauthorised devices. Battery-depletion
attacks are prevented as unauthorised messages are not
processed by nodes. Thus, the work by Martinovic et al.
is close to the presented DBMA work as it achieves the
same goal using a different mechanism.
Capkun et al. [7] discuss generally accuracy of posi-
tioning system if attackers are present. Internal attackers
can report false position and distance information in
order to lie about their position. External attackers can
spoof the measured positions and distances. It is pointed
out that out of all available positioning methods radio
frequency (RF) based time of flight (ToF) measurements
have the best security properties. RF signals travel at the
speed of light and an attacker can only increase but not
decrease the measured ToF between nodes. The DBMA
implementation presented and evaluated in this paper
makes use of RF ToF distance measurements.
In our previous work [8] we have described the
principal mechanisms of DBMA. We also described a
protocol called RTTMAP that can be used to implement
DBMA. However, our previous work does not provide
insight into real-world implementation of DBMA or an
analysis of its performance in a deployment scenario.
III. DISTANCE BASED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
In this section we motivate and explain the concept of
DBMA and we describe briefly the protocol RTTMAP
that can be used to implement DBMA.
A. DBMA Scenario
We are experimenting with a physical intrusion de-
tection system used to secure buildings. Nodes equipped
with sensors, such as infra-red detectors or door contacts,
report observations to a sink for data analysis, logging
and alarm generation. The network currently relies on
cryptographic safeguards. Each node signs messages
using a unique symmetric key shared with the sink.
This approach is feasible but has some drawbacks.
Firstly, a key management protocol has to be executed
in the network consuming scarce bandwidth and energy
resources. Secondly, scarce energy and computation re-
sources are used to cryptographically authenticate mes-
sages. Thus, an attacker may drain energy by injecting
unauthorised messages which need to be cryptographi-
cally processed before they can be discarded.
DBMA can be used to augment the existing cryp-
tographic mechanisms or it could be used to replace
them entirely in some scenarios. DBMA aims to solve
the two previously outlined problems. First, DBMA
does not require costly key distribution. Second, DBMA
prevents costly processing of unauthorised messages.
The outlined application scenario can use DBMA as a
secure area can be enforced. The WSN itself is used to
restrict physical access to a secure area.
B. DBMA Implementation Considerations
DBMA uses the distance between two nodes as a
security parameter. If the RF communication transceiver
is used for DBMA, two basic approaches are possible:
Received Signal Strength (RSSI) and Time-of-Flight
(ToF).
RSSI is generally useful for distance measurements.
However, in the context of DBMA, RSSI is unsuitable.
An attacker can increase transmission power at will.
Therefore, an attacker is able to artificially decrease
distance measurements and appear to be located in the
secure area.
Figure 1. RTTMAP Message Exchange.
ToF measures the propagation delay between nodes.
The propagation delay constant is used to derive dis-
tances and an attacker is thus not able to artificially
decrease distance measurements.
For a simple ToF measurement a sender has to embed
a time stamp in the message in order to allow a receiver
to determine the signal propagation delay. Furthermore,
sender and receiver must have synchronised clocks to an
accuracy of a few nanoseconds. Secure clock synchro-
nisation is hard to achieve and, more importantly, the
time stamp embedded in the message may not be trust-
worthy; a different approach to ToF measurement is thus
necessary. A Round-Trip-Time (RTT) ToF measurement
initiated by the message receiver addresses the outlined
issues.
C. Round-Trip-Time Message Authentication Protocol
The aforementioned RTT measurement mechanism
must be incorporated into a communication protocol, but
it must be initiated by the receiver. RTTMAP described
in this paragraph can be used for this purpose. A detailed
description and analysis of RTTMAP can be found in [8].
A sender first transmits a control message to the
receiver signalling a pending data transmission. The
receiver responds with a second control message which,
upon reception, triggers immediate transmission of the
data message by the sender. Thus, the receiver is able to
compute distance from a round trip time measurement
using the second control and data messages.
It must be ensured that a sender is not able to transmit
the data message early as this would allow him to reduce
the distance artificially. Capkun et. al [7] proposed
including nonces in ranging messages1 to avoid early
responses and achieve secure RTT measurements. An
attacker could respond late, but this is not a problem
as the observed distance would increase and he would
appear to be outside the secure area.
During network planning, each node is configured
with a distance threshold value r that is determined by
the deployer. r is set such that all neighbours with which
the node shall communicate are closer than r. Nodes
that are excluded from communication are assumed to
be always further away than r. r obviously has to include
any measurement error, as we discuss in Section V.
1For secure localisation rather than message authentication.
RTTMAP requires the following three phases for each
message exchange (see Figure 1):
1) The sender adds a fresh counter value i to message
M . A commitment is computed using the hash
function: cM = h(M). cM is sent to the receiver.
2) The receiver caches cM and creates a fresh nonce
n. n is sent to the sender as timer is started.
3) The sender returns M |n to the receiver. The re-
ceiver takes a timer reading t to calculate distance
r′. The receiver recovers M from the response.
M is accepted only if r′ < r, i is fresh, and
cM = h(M).
To avoid attacks on the protocol itself, nodes do not
accept messages unless they are in a state where they are
expected to arrive. The cached cM and timer t cannot be
changed until the message has been received or a timeout
has occurred. RTTMAP uses the nonce to prevent early
responses by a potential attacker. Message replay is
avoided by using the counter value i. This is especially
important as the same message may be sent often and an
attacker may be able to form a dictionary of messages
and associated hash values. A participant is forced to
participate in all three stages of the protocol due to the
use of the hash function, so an attacker cannot send a
message without participating in the first phase. The hash
function is only invoked if the distance measurement is
acceptable, thus adding protection.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
For the implementation we chose the Nanotron DK
development kit which comprises an Atmel ATmega128
MCU and a Nanotron NA5TR1 transceiver [1]. The
NA5TR1 supports RTT distance measurement and oper-
ates in the same power class as commonly used sensor
node transceivers such as the Chipcon CC2420. The
NA5TR1 uses Chirp Spread Spectrum modulation in the
2.4GHz ISM band. The NA5TR1 has a maximum power
utilisation of 33mA at 2.7V , a maximum transmit power
of 1mW and timing provides ranging accuracy of 1m
in ideal conditions. Currently no WSN operating system
such as TinyOS exists for the platform, so the provided
C API was utilised. We used the MIRACL [9] library
for the SHA-256 hash function.
A. RTTMAP Implementation Challenges
To implement RTTMAP it must be possible to imple-
ment the outlined three phases of a message transmis-
sion. This is possible in principal, however, the Nanotron
API does not allow us to transmit user data within
ranging transmissions. We thus modified the protocol
such that it is implementable on the NA5TR1. We call
the modified protocol RTTMAP-N. RTTMAP-N is not
as efficient as RTTMAP but provides the same properties
Figure 2. RTTMAP-N Message Exchange.
in terms of participation enforcement. Thus, RTTMAP-
N allows DBMA performance evaluation as presented in
the next sections.
B. RTTMAP-N Implementation
To achieve RTTMAP equivalent functionality,
RTTMAP-N modifies the MAC addresses during the
ranging process. Each node is still configured with a
distance threshold value r, but four phases for each
message transmission are used (see Figure 2):
1) The sender adds a fresh counter value i to message
M . A commitment is computed using the hash
function: cM = h(M). cM is sent to the receiver
and the MAC address of the sender is set to a
temporary address a′ based on cM .
2) The receiver caches cM and the original address a
of the sender. The MAC address of the receiver is
randomised to b′ and a ranging request is sent to
a′ as the ranging timer is started.
3) The sender sends a ranging acknowledgment to b′.
4) Both nodes restore the original MAC addresses a
and b. The sender then sends M to the receiver.
The receiver takes a timer reading t to calculate
distance r′. The receiver recovers M from the
packet. M is accepted only if cM = h(M), r′ < r
and i is fresh.
RTTMAP-N does not require a nonce, because the
randomised MAC address of the receiver is not known
by the sender until the ranging request is received thus
providing the same function. RTTMAP-N does not need
to insert M into the ranging response because both the
delivery of M and the ranging acknowledgment are
separately linked to the secure ranging via the hash
commitment.
V. EVALUATION OF DBMA DEPLOYMENTS
To evaluate DBMA performance we collected range
measurements from two test deployments (see Figure 3).
Deployment A is in a modern office building comprising
of earthed metal floor and roof panels with glass office
partitions containing metal blinds. Deployment B is a
small radio station of traditional breeze block construc-
tion with fewer earthed and metallic surfaces. We chose
these two deployments due to the different construction
techniques and therefore differences in RF propagation
Figure 3. Deployment A (top) and Deployment B (bottom).
Figure 4. Actual vs. average distance measurement in Deployment B.
patterns. The figures show node positions and commu-
nication links available for topology construction.
To conduct measurements, nodes were placed in the
intended sensor node positions and 50 RTT measure-
ments were carried out on each available link. These
samples give us a picture of the distance measurement
distribution on each link. RTT distance measurement
distribution is similar for both transmission directions
on a link as an RTT measurement requires transmission
in both directions. The secure area must be selected to
compensate for such measurement errors on used links.
A. Distance Measurement Errors
In an ideal world, we would configure all nodes with
a distance threshold such that they can communicate
with their neighbours, but not with nodes further away.
The security area would then be placed such that it
encompassed the distance thresholds for all nodes in the
network. In reality, the security area must be enlarged to
account for ranging errors. Realistic distance measure-
ments contain two types of errors:
• Timing Errors: Timing error is related to the design
of hardware and and issues such as clock drift. This
Figure 5. Deployment B. Black circles indicate ideal thresholds.
Blue circles indicate required maximum measured thresholds. Black
boundary indicates ideal secure area (339.34m2). Blue boundary
indicates required secure area (788m2).
error can be negative or positive, but is bounded and
only influenced by the receiver of the message (An
attacker is unable to increase this potential negative
error). In the case of the NA5TR1, this results in a
distance error of up to ±1m.
• Propagation Errors: Propagation error is related
to the signal pathway and edge detection delay
in the transceiver. The error is always positive
as the signal cannot travel faster than the speed
of light. However, the error can be regarded as
being unbounded. In our deployments we observe
propagation errors of up to +10m.
Figure 4 shows the Euclidean distance and the average
of measured distance for each link in deployment B. It
is clear that there is no reliable correlation between the
two values meaning that defining the security boundary
requires test data on a per-deployment basis.
B. Secure Area Size
It is not possible to subtract the expected ranging error
when measuring communication distance; an attacker
might be able to transmit a message to a node with less
error by choosing an optimal path. Fitting the secure
area to the observed worst-case measurement ensures
that an attacker cannot pretend to be located in the secure
area, whilst maintaining a high probability that genuine
messages will be accepted. Unfortunately this requires
that the maximum measurement on each link is used as
the authentication threshold, thus enlarging the secure
area requirement greatly when links have large errors.
Figure 5 shows the minimum and maximum secure
area in deployment B. For practical reasons the secure
area has the form of a square and not an arbitrary shaped
form. The maximum secure area is more than double the
minimum in both deployments. From a practical perspec-
tive this results in high financial costs as a lot of land
is needed to implement the secure zone. It is therefore
desirable to exclude links that increase the secure area
requirement undesirably, but are not needed to form a
Algorithm 1 Recursive algorithm to find best average value and
resulting path to the sink for node n. Where v is a cloned list of nodes
visited in this path previously.
Function bestAvg( v )
If v.contains(n) then return null.
If n is the sink then return {n},0.
v.add(n).
Let b = null, c = infinity.
For each local link l
Let p,a = l.otherNode().bestAvg(v).
If p not null
p.add(n).
Let s = p.size.
Let d =(a*(s-1)+l.metric/s).
If b = null then b = p and c = d.
If d < c then b = p and c = d.
Return b,c.
fully connected network. For example, in deployment B
it possible to exclude link 14 (see Figure 3) which has
huge distance measurement errors (see Figure 4). Nodes
could forward messages along link 4 and 5 which have
better error values. However, it is not always the case that
the exclusion of links with large errors leads to reduction
in the secure area size; the location of a link within the
network plays a role as well since large errors deep in
the network may not require expansion. These topology
optimisations are discussed in the next section.
VI. OPTIMISING RTTMAP DEPLOYMENTS
In this section we introduce link-pruning to exclude
links leading to an unnecessary large secure area over-
head. The proposed link pruning algorithm is evaluated
using the two deployments outlined in the previous
section.
A. Link Pruning Algorithm
To decide which of the available links should be used
to form the network topology Algorithm 1 is executed
to search all the pathways to the sink from a given node,
calculating the average value and selecting the best path.
The algorithm is applied to each node in the network
and the links on the selected path are enabled. Each
link has an associated cost metric which is evaluated
in order to decide which links should be included in
the network topology. Three different cost metrics were
used within Algorithm 1: (1) Physical length of the
link; (2) Maximum distance measurement of the link;
(3) Overhead contribution.
Metric (1) and (2) are directly available from the
deployment. Metric (3) is calculated based on the ideal
secure area and signifies the worst case expansion needed
in any dimension if the link is enabled, as shown in
Figure 6. Thus links with errors that do not require
enlargement of the secure zone are not penalised. This
approach improves the number of links that can be
considered, particularly deeper in the network.
Figure 6. Overhead contribution. For each dimension from each node,
the maximum measured distance is subtracted from the distance to the
boundary. The worst of all options is used, with a minimum of zero.
Deployment A Deployment B
O h l O h l
No pruning 177.06% 4.08 24 132.22% 3.00 17
Physical (1) 138.41% 6.67 13 125.86% 4.89 9
Meas. (2) 6.23% 5.33 13 1.73% 4.00 10
O. Contr. (3) 3.64% 5.17 13 0.76% 4.89 10
Table I
SECURE AREA OVERHEADS IN DEPLOYMENT A AND
DEPLOYMENT B WITHOUT APPLYING ALGORITHM 1 AND AFTER
APPLYING ALGORITHM 1 USING METRICS (1), (2) AND (3).
B. Link Pruning Results
To discuss the results we use the term minimum secure
area size Amin, which is the area that would be required
in the absence of distance measurement errors; the term
maximum secure area size Amax, which is the area
required in the presence of all errors and in case all
available links are used by the network; and the term
required secure area size Areq, which is the area required
after link pruning Algorithm 1 has selected links.
To gauge the effectiveness of link pruning we deter-
mine the secure area overhead O calculated as: O =
(Areq−Amin)/Amin. We also calculate the average hop
distance h of nodes from the sink. We also record the
number of links l used in the topology after link pruning.
The results are summarised in Table I. In Deploy-
ment A Amax = 2598.66m2 and Amin = 937.93m2
was recorded. In Deployment B Amax = 788m2 and
Amin = 339.34m
2 is observed. In both deployments
the pruning algorithm using metric (3) achieves the best
results: Areq = 972.03m2 and Breq = 341.92m2.
C. Findings
It is obviously beneficial to use link pruning as it
allows us to reduce the required secure area size. In
Deployment A the secure area overhead can be reduced
from 177.06% to 3.64%, in Deployment B a reduction
from 132.22% to 0.76% is achieved. As shown in Table I
the average hop distance from each nodes to the sink
increases if link pruning is used. Therefore, a decrease
in secure area size can be traded for an increase in
communication latency.
It has to be noted that the evaluated link pruning
algorithm may not be the best available algorithm, we
have chosen this method to permit potential use within
the network itself. Other link pruning algorithms may
be more effective. Link pruning may not be effective
in cases where all links exhibit high error; but we have
shown this not to be the case in our deployments.
VII. CONCLUSION
We described an implementation of Distance Based
Message Authentication for sensor nodes equipped with
the NanoLOC TRX NA5TR1 transceiver. As demon-
strated, DBMA provides a practical additional layer of
defense for WSN deployments.
Using data from real deployments, we evaluated the
impact of propagation error on secure area overhead.
We proposed link-pruning to reduce secure area size
requirements. We show that link-pruning can reduce
the required secure area size by a factor of 2 in the
investigated deployment scenarios.
Future work will consider the implementation of the
original RTTMAP protocol to replace the less efficient
RTTMAP-N implementation. To do so it is necessary to
change the API provided by NanoLOC. Other aspects
are the integration of RTTMAP in low-power MAC
protocols and the evaluation of hardware security issues.
REFERENCES
[1] “NanoLOC TRX NA5TR1,” Nanotron Technologies, 2008.
[2] “802.15.4 Standard,” IEEE, 2007.
[3] Hu, W. and Corke, P. and Shih, W. and Overs, L., "secfleck: A
public key technology platform for wireless sensor networks," In
proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Wireless Sensor
Networks, Cork, Ireland, 2009.
[4] Liu, A. and Ning, P., “TinyECC: A Configurable Library for
Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Wireless Sensor Networks,” In
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information
Processing in Sensor Networks, St. Louis, Missouri, USA, 2008.
[5] Szczechowiak, P. and Oliveira, L. and Scott, M. and Collier, M.
and Dahab, R. “NanoECC: Testing the limits of elliptic curve
cryptography in sensor networks,” In Proceedings of the 5th
European Conference on Wireless Sensor Networks, Bologna,
Italy, 2008.
[6] Martinovic, I. and Pichota, P., and Schmitt, J. B., “Jamming for
good: a fresh approach to authentic communication in WSNs,” In
Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Wireless Network
Security, Zurich, Switzerland, 2009.
[7] Capkun, S. and Hubaux, J. P., “Secure positioning in wireless
networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
2006.
[8] Chung, T. and Roedig, U., “On The Feasibility of a New Defense
Layer for Wireless Sensor Networks using RF Ranging,” In
proceedings of the IFIP Network and Service Security Conference,
Paris, France, 2009.
[9] “MIRACL,” Shamus Software, 2009.
